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“Legal interpretation takes place in a
field of pain and death.”
Robert Cover (1986)
1. Introduction
A simple internet search for information about Back-
page.com CEO Carl Ferrer yields little. Based on the re-
sults, it would seem that Ferrer’s life began in 2004,when
he teamed up with New Times Media principles Michael
Lacey and James Larkin to launch Backpage.com, the
world’s largest online purveyor of “adult services” adver-
tisements, as a strategic response to the market-driven
migration of classified ads from print to internet vehi-
cles. Since then, Ferrer’s persona is best grasped through
the phrase “no comment,” repeated on camera and in
print to reporters, judges, and legislators seeking his re-
sponse to charges of trafficking adults and minors on
Backpage.com—charges arising from law enforcement,
trafficking victims and their amici in state courts around
the country, and even the Senate Permanent Subcom-
mittee on Investigations. Like other powerful people
charged with unethical or criminal behavior, Ferrer’s eva-
sion of even the question of the charges only added to
the sense of invulnerability attached to his image as an
international corporate CEO—that is, until his arrest in
October 2016 on felony charges of pimping and conspir-
acy, at which point his mug shot became the primary im-
age radiating from internet search engines.
This article considers the role of the law in pro-
ducing the gap between the Ferrer empowered to re-
pel inquiry with the phrase “no comment” and the
Ferrer compelled to respond to allegations as a crim-
inal defendant in a court of law—in other words, be-
tween Ferrer the CEO and Ferrer the alleged pimp and
trafficker. The crux of the matter—justice and redress
for minors trafficked through advertisements posted on
Backpage.com—remains stuck in that breach, reminding
us that the law is a flexible instrument, a power-tool as
likely to preclude as to produce justice. What lies in the
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space between justice and its foreclosure is precisely the
paradox that legal scholars Robert Cover and Colin Dayan
have identified as the violence of the law, wielded pur-
posefully or not by legislators (makers of the law) and
judges (interpreters and distributors of the law). If the
law came into being as an instrument to prevent the com-
mission of violence, and to protect the weak from the
strong, then, as Colin Dayan (2011) writes, “legal reason-
ing [must bemade] as vital as the lives of persons lethally
affected by it” (p. x).
I take up Dayan’s challenge here, commencing by
briefly situating suits against Backpage.com within the
context of changing laws and norms of sexual commerce
and trafficking, and of evolving legal interpretations of
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA),
which has been evoked repeatedly to shield internet ser-
vice providers such as Backpage.com from liability for
content generated by third parties that has led to crim-
inal harm to others. Moving to a critique of the technol-
ogy of law as at times grievously detached from the re-
alities it addresses and the spirit of justice it is meant to
bring into being, I compare the legal strategies and de-
cisions in three prominent cases brought against Back-
page.com in St. Louis, Tacoma, and Boston, respectively,
identifying the evacuation of gendered bodies and the
harm done to them from the court opinions as an exam-
ple of the “interpretive violence” of the law, and calling
for courts and congress to act together to disrupt the pro-
ceduralist accumulation of precedent favoring freedom
of commerce and speech over the protection of bodies
from harm.1
2. Commercial Sex, Human Trafficking, and Slavery2
I begin with a brief description of the three cases un-
der consideration here. The first, filed on September 16,
2010 in US District Court, Missouri, sought justice for
M.A., a 13-year old child whowas recruited at a fast food
restaurant after she snuck out of her mother’s home to
attend a party. The child was missing for 270 days and
raped repeatedly as a result of being sold online via Back-
page.com.OnAugust 15, 2011, the Court decided against
M.A., dismissing the case on the basis that Backpage.com
is protected under Section 230 of the CDA. No appeals
were filed.
The second case involves a 15-year old who ran away
from home and was recruited at a teen homeless shel-
ter in Tacoma by an older woman to “go to the beach.”
Within hours, the child was being sold repeatedly on
Backpage.com. She was missing for 180 days. This case,
originally filed in 2013, is the only case brought by a child
against Backpage.com to survive a motion to dismiss. In
this potentially precedent overturning (and re-setting)
case, the Washington Supreme Court decided that there
was enough evidence against Backpage.com to support
moving to discovery and litigation in a trial set for May
2017.
The final case against Backpage.com was brought by
Boston law firm Ropes and Gray in 2014 on behalf of
three minor children trafficked for sex in Massachusetts
and Rhode Island via online advertisements on Back-
page.com. Like the others, this suit sought to hold Back-
page.com accountable for alleged criminal actions to fa-
cilitate the efforts of sex traffickers to sell children on its
site. Backpage.com’s Motion to Dismiss was granted by
the federal district court judge in May, 2015, on the ba-
sis that Backpage.com was acting as a publisher of third
party content and thus, was protected by Section 230.
The 1st Circuit Court of Appeals upheld that ruling in
March of 2016, expanding the protective coverage of Sec-
tion 230 to an unprecedented extent: that Section 230
would protect a publisher who was a co-conspirator in a
federal crime—in this case, the crime of child sex traffick-
ing. A last challenge was filed on behalf of the Jane Does
in the US Supreme Court, which declined in January 2017
to hear the case.
Unfortunately, the outcomes on behalf of the Jane
Does are not surprising. Cases brought on behalf of mi-
nor children trafficked online for commercial sex unfold
within a turbulent social and political field dominated by
a split between, on one hand, those who seek to decrim-
inalize prostitution, defining it as labor and arguing that
criminal stigma and consequences cause far graver vio-
lence to sex workers than the harm typically associated
with the act of commercial sex itself, and, on the other,
those who seek to end trafficking by employing vari-
ous models of prevention and criminalization of transac-
tional sex. Consensus among those in the latter camps
has converged around what has come to be known as
the Nordic Model, whereby the purchase of sex is crimi-
nalized but the sale is not, thereby shifting attention to
the demand side of the transaction and correcting the
previous legal travesty by which those who sold sex suf-
fered criminal consequences while those who purchased
it walked free. At the same time, international agencies
such as the United Nations, the World Health Organiza-
tion, and the International Labor Organization (ILO) have
advocated for the rights of sex workers, and Amnesty In-
ternational, arguably the world’s largest human rights or-
ganization, formally adopted in 2015 a policy that calls
for the end of decriminalization of all consensual sex
work. The trouble with that policy, of course, is iden-
tifying “consensual” v. “nonconsensual” sexual transac-
tions in a fundamentally coercive environment where
1 The cases under discussion here are explored in depth in the documentary feature I Am Jane Doe, Dir. Mary Mazzio (2017), which chronicles the fight
against Backpage.com waged by the minor survivors, their families, and others who support their struggle.
2 My discussion of the commercial sex trade relies on data from the International Labor Organization Global Estimate of Forced Labor (2012a), which esti-
mates that of the 20.9 million people currently trapped in forced labor, 4.5 million are victims of forced sexual exploitation; of these, 98% are women or
girls (see International Labor Organization, 2012b). Plaintiffs in each of the cases under consideration in this article are minor girls. Gendering sexually
exploited people female in this work is not meant to discount the experiences of male or transgender persons engaged in the commercial sex trade
and/or experiencing commercial sexual exploitation.
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freedom of choice, as commonly understood, is absent.
This brings us to the issue of the relation between com-
mercial sex, trafficking, and slavery.
Volumes have been written on issues of consent and
agency, and on definitions of slavery, trafficking, and
bondage in relation to the commercial sex trade, and
it is beyond the scope of this work to parse those de-
bates. The ILO defines forced labor (e.g., nonconsen-
sual sex work) quite simply as a situation in which per-
sons are made to work against their free will. The schol-
arly organization Historians Against Slavery, made up of
leading scholars of slavery and abolition, adds “for the
profit of others” to this definition (Historians Against
Slavery, n.d.).3 The United Nations Protocol to Prevent,
Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially
Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime—the
Palermo Protocol—(United Nations General Assembly,
2000b) defines trafficking as:
[T]he recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbour-
ing or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction,
of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power or of
a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiv-
ing of payments or benefits to achieve the consent
of a person having control over another person, for
the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include,
at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slav-
ery, servitude or the removal of organs.
Significantly, according to this Protocol, the exploitation
of a child need not be the result of coercion or any of
the other means listed above; a child is defined as any
person under 18 years of age. The cases under consider-
ation here were all presented on behalf of minors; thus,
according to international and domestic law, there is no
disagreement about whether or not their exploitation
meets the legal definition of trafficking. It does. As a legal
matter, there is no consent.
Still, acknowledging the complexity of the debates
and the difficulty of concretely identifying slavery and
trafficking in the contemporary global context, I embrace
Joel Quirk’s (2011) theorization of “sufficient similarity”
as a way of identifying forms of human bondage that re-
semble classical (transatlantic) slavery closely enough to
demand redress, accepting that “the practices in ques-
tion are not always identical, yet…still share sufficient
features in common to be placed on the same footing”
(p. 9). Considering the long and deeply contested history
of activism and legislation against commercial sexual ex-
ploitation, I also find Quirk’s identification of abolition as
an “anti-slavery project” to be a useful framework, inas-
much as it provides room for nuance to consider differ-
ent forms of bondage along with the range of strategies
and uneven progress in disrupting them, all without re-
ducing the histories of slavery and anti-slavery initiatives
to a “linear or teleological process” (p. 19).
Significantly, as Quirk notes, from the first steps to-
ward legal abolition of slavery in the mid-eighteenth
century to the ongoing anti-trafficking activism of the
21st, “there was a significant pattern of delay, deflec-
tion, and dilution. These strategies may not amount to
much in macro-historical terms, since slavery was even-
tually [legally] abolished, but their cumulative human
cost was astronomical” (p. 19). My purpose here is to re-
store the account of such human cost to the narratives of
the Jane Doe plaintiffs, who most certainly experienced
treatment that bears “sufficient similarity” to slavery. Do-
ing so requires illuminating plaintiffs’ lived experiences
and the claims for justice to which they give rise from
within the shade of the normative world, or nomos, that
has grownup around legal efforts to redress child sex traf-
ficking today.
3. Commercial Sex: From the Streets to the Internet
The problem at issue in the St. Louis, Tacoma, and Boston
cases is not whether the child plaintiffs were trafficked
for commercial sex (a fact accepted by the court in each
case), but rather whether Backpage.com, the internet
service provider that hosted the ads initiating their vi-
olation, can be held at least partially responsible for
that crime. In order to understand the relevant legal is-
sues, let us first consider the shift of the commercial sex
trade from “the streets”—the “stroll,” massage parlor,
brothel, etc.—to the internet, wherein the seller of sex
acts is identified via an online host and details for the
transaction, includingmeeting place, are arranged online
and/or by telephone. This shift arose as the internet de-
veloped as a technology and means of connection, com-
munication, and commerce in the late 1990s and early
2000s, and has also been associatedwith thewidespread
racialized gentrification and “lawandorder” policing that
mark this period.
Sociologist Elizabeth Bernstein correlates the shift of
commercial sex from street to internet with other socio-
economic trends, including the rise of the post-industrial
service and tech industries and the deconstruction of tra-
ditional marriage and family ties. As Melissa Gira Grant
(2014) notes in a description of Bernstein’s research, “In
an economy in which workers of all kinds are called on
to produce an experience—not just a coffee, but a smile
and a personal greeting; not just a vacation, but a spir-
itual retreat—sex work fits quite comfortably” (p. 95).
This focus upon an “experience” accounts for a broad
expansion in the menu of sexual services in the online
market, from simple acts (“hand job,” oral, intercourse)
to performative role-play of everything from BDSM and
fetish to “Girlfriend Experience (GFE).” This latter consti-
tutes what Bernstein calls “bounded intimacy,” available
for sale in a world dominated by work and market forces
3 Full disclosure: I sit on the board of this NGO.
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with little time and less interest in the demands of long-
term emotional investments.
This trend toward transactional socio-sexual rela-
tions extends far beyond the world of commercial sex,
as Bernstein (2007) notes:
Sociologists of culture have…pointed to a gen-
eral trend of ‘disenchantment’ or ‘cultural cooling’
whereby intimate exchanges have increasingly come
to resemble other forms of utilitarian exchanges.
Whether in the guise of…efficiently managed ‘qual-
ity time’ with one’s own children, or via an emerging
ideology of romantic love that ‘endorses flexibility
and eschews permanence,’ public-sphere market log-
ics have become intricately intertwined with private-
sphere emotional needs. (p. 5)
Interestingly, these trends mirror the broader neoliberal
embrace of freedom of markets and commerce at the
expense of bodies and humans, a worldview that “sees
competition as the defining characteristic of human re-
lations. It redefines citizens as consumers, whose demo-
cratic choices are best exercised by buying and selling, a
process that rewards merit and punishes inefficiency. It
maintains that the ‘market’ delivers benefits that could
never be achieved by planning” (Monbiot, 2016). Inter-
estingly, this description of dominant neoliberal ideology
resonates with Bernstein’s observation, based in field-
work with members of COYOTE (Call Off Your Old Tired
Ethics), the nation’s first sex worker rights organization,
that “the ethical and social world they inhabited was
a fair approximation of ‘the universal market in bodies
and services’ that feminist political theorist Carole Pate-
man predicted would arise if the logic of contract were
allowed completely free reign” (Bernstein, 2007, p. 106;
see also Pateman, 1988).
The logic of contract, the emphasis upon free mar-
ket competition, the definition of citizens as consumers,
the allegiance to commerce over citizens, as well as
cultural assumptions about consensual sex work—all
are at play in the many legal decisions that have al-
lowed Backpage.com to continue operations despite
overwhelming evidence unearthed by the US Senate of
Backpage.com’s complicity with commercial sexual ex-
ploitation writ large, and more specifically and egre-
giously, with the trafficking ofminor children for sex. Sub-
stitute “property” for “commerce” in the sentence above
and the through-line of such logics that support rights
of property/commerce over personhood/protection is
made visible, thereby situating the Jane Doe cases in
the long history of US slavery and its enabling legal ap-
paratus. Indeed, the cases share many similarities with
those that Cover analyzed in Justice Accused: Antislav-
ery and the Judicial Process (1975), his seminal study of
judicial conduct and decisions about slavery in the US,
particularly the problem of judges caught in the “moral-
formal dilemma,” or in the gap between what is morally
right (liberty for all persons) and what is legally, proce-
durally, and formally correct (state laws governing own-
ership or manumission, for instance, or federal laws such
as the Fugitive Slave Act). In such cases, Cover concluded,
judges faced with a moral dilemma consistently revert
to “the highest justifications for formalism, the most
mechanical understanding of precedent, and the stead-
fast excision of self and appeal to separation of powers”
(1975, p. 258). Aswe shall see, precisely the same judicial
maneuvers manifest in the Jane Doe cases.
4. The Communications Decency Act (CDA) Section 230
At the heart of Backpage.com’s power to thwart legal
responsibility for its part in the trafficking of minors for
commercial sex is Section 230 of the CDA. Introduced by
Senator James Exon of Nebraska, its purpose was to ad-
dress concerns about the ease of access to pornography
afforded by the internet, particularly for children, at a
time when the internet was still very new. Congress was
clear that its intent with the legislation was to “target
content providers, not access providers or users;” how-
ever, Congress also made clear that “owners of telecom-
munication facilities are liable where they knowingly per-
mit their facilities to be used in a manner that violates
the CDA.”
The most controversial aspect of the CDA, Section
230, was not found in the original Act, but rather was
added by the House of Representatives as “The Inter-
net Freedom and Family Empowerment Act.” This law,
which states that “No provider or user of an interactive
computer service shall be treated as the publisher or
speaker of any information provided by another infor-
mation content provider,” was prompted by a lawsuit
filed in 1995 by Stratton Oakmont (a firm founded by Jor-
dan Belfort and made famous by the Leonardo DiCaprio
film, “Wolf of Wall Street”). Stratton Oakmont had filed
suit against Prodigy (one of the earlier internet message
boards) because someone had posted a comment assert-
ing that Stratton Oakmont had been criminally manipu-
lating stocks. Belfort’s firm argued that because Prodigy
filtered content but missed this post, it should be held
responsible for third party content on its site. The court
agreed, and Prodigywas held liable for defamation. Legis-
lators, in turn, found this to be an alarming development,
worrying about the “chilling effect” on the newly emer-
gent internet economy should internet service providers
be flooded with such lawsuits every time someone be-
came upset by a posting or comment.
The irony is that had Prodigy not initiated any at-
tempts to monitor and filter content—in other words,
if it had done nothing to protect against indecency or
defamation—it would not have been held responsible,
and would have suffered no penalties. But because it
had initiated such efforts and failed to catch a “de-
faming” post, it was held liable by the court. This, of
course, was seen as a major disincentive for internet
service providers (ISPs, such as AOL, Google…and Back-
page.com) to take any steps toward monitoring the con-
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tent posted by third party users on their sites. In re-
sponse, Section 230 legislatively overruled the Stratton
decision by protecting from liability those providers who
had made “good faith efforts” to monitor the content
posted on their sites. Of course, the question ofwhat con-
stitutes “good faith” efforts by ISPs to filter indecent or
defaming content remains undecided, with courts erring
on the side of publishers in nearly every decision inwhich
CDA Section 230 is evoked as a defense, evenwhen those
publishers have arguably not acted in good faith or have
collaborated with users to create the content of their
posts, and even when those posts constitute criminal
activity—such as sex trafficking—under US law.
For the purposes of the cases examined below, the
operative issues regarding Section 230 are:
1) whether Backpage.com can be treated as more
than just the publisher of the ads in question, but
rather as a participant in creating them. If it can be
shown that Backpage.com developed “in whole or
in part” the content of the ads that caused harm,
then Backpage.com could be held liable because it
would no longer be a passive publisher;
2) whether Backpage.com’s stated efforts to identify
and eliminate “escort” advertisements that fea-
ture minors constitute “good faith” efforts as re-
quired in Section 230(c)(2)(A) or, as a Congres-
sional report on the matter asserts (in support of
the many claims put forth by plaintiffs in state
courts around the country), Backpage.com’s “ef-
forts” have more to do with inhibiting law enforce-
ment attempts to identify such ads and helping
pimps to post them without detection; and
3) whether civil private right of claims of criminal
action can be brought under Section 230 (e)(1),
which asserts that that “Nothing in this section
shall be construed to impair the enforcement of
section 223 or 231 of this title, chapter 71 (relating
to obscenity) or 110 (relating to sexual exploitation
of children) of title 18, or any other Federal crimi-
nal statute.”
In many ways, the struggle between Section 230 and the
plaintiffs who have been harmed by the internet service
providers it protects rests upon two points: precedent
and jurisdiction (or separation of powers), both of which
I address below through theories of legal interpretation.
In each of the court decisions under examination here,
as well as in many others, the court expresses dismay at
not being able to offer remedy to plaintiffs, but, referring
to the many precedents of cases dismissed on the basis
of Section 230 protection, argues that the matter is for
Congress to correct legislatively, rather than for courts to
re-interpret what they see as the plain language of Sec-
tion 230 to err on the side of protection for ISPs. As Judge
Selya of the 1st Circuit Court of Appeals put it in a phrase
much-quoted by Backpage.com in its opposition briefs,
“There has been near-universal agreement that Section
230 should not be applied grudgingly” (Jane Doe v. Back-
page.com, 2016, p. 10). Nearly every opinion repeats the
phrase that originated with Section 230, that allowing
ISPs to be held liable for third-party content posted by
their users would have a “chilling effect” on the oppor-
tunities for freedom of speech and commerce provided
by the internet. It is worth noting that in the bulk of the
300 cases adjudicating Section 230, the majority involve
defamation, and not allegations of criminal conduct. In
response, plaintiffs and their amici argue passionately
that in passing the CDA (major “decency” provisions of
which were struck down as unconstitutional in the late
1990s, leaving only Section 230 as a basis for positive law
in cases involving ISP liability), Congress did not mean
to create a protected space—much less a broad immu-
nity (a word used in several judicial opinions, but a word
which does not appear in the statute itself)—for criminal
enterprise on the internet that could not possibly be per-
mitted in “brick and mortar” spaces. As Erik Bauer, lead
attorney on J.S. v. Backpage.com in Tacoma, protests:
Prosecutors will go after a kid on the streets, an 18-
year old kid selling 12-year olds, but they won’t go
after Backpage…This is not about freedom of speech,
this is not about freedom of sexuality, it’s about the
freedom of a kid to get raped by someone who has
paid a pimp for the pleasure. It’s about a company
that has enabled that to happen on a massive scale, a
company that has taken advantage of this miracle of
marketing called the internet to blow human sex traf-
ficking right through the roof. No one thinks that this
is what Congress intended when they passed Section
230. (Bauer, 2016, interview with author)
The question remains whether the courts will continue
to dodge the issue by referring it back to Congress, and
whether, then, Congress will act legislatively to block the
unintended escape route currently entrenched within
the law.
5. The Cases and the Legal Strategies
Studying the cases brought against Backpage.com for
their strategies and the grounds upon which plaintiffs’
claims are brought is an exercise in the complexity of le-
gal theory and method, and of the potential for violence
inherent within judicial interpretation and the applica-
tion of precedent. For our purposes, it is important to
clarify the legal grounds uponwhich each teamadvanced
its case, and the response of the courts to those claims in
relation to the seemingly insurmountable barrier of Sec-
tion 230 protection.
5.1. St. Louis: M.A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings, LLC.,
and Backpage.com, LLC.
In 2009, 13-year old M.A. ran away from home and was
trafficked for commercial sex by Latasha Jewell McFar-
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land, who served time in prison on charges of sex traffick-
ing and illegal interstate commerce as a result. As the ads
used by McFarland to traffic M.A. were posted on Back-
page.com,M.A. attempted to prove that Backpage.com’s
posting rules and limitations “aid in the sight veiling of il-
legal sex services ads to create the veil of legality” (M.A.
v. Village VoiceMedia Holdings and Backpage.com, 2011,
p. 187) and that therefore Backpage.com must be char-
acterized as an “Information Content Provider,” rather
than simply a publisher of third-party content. As a con-
tent provider, Backpage.com would not be protected by
Section 230 from processes of discovery and litigation
related to criminal or civil charges. In addition to alleg-
ing criminal charges of aiding and abetting her traffick-
ers, M.A. also argued that Backpage.com and its parent
company, Village Voice Media Holdings, had violated her
rights under the Optional Protocol to the Convention on
the Rights of the Child on the Sale of Children, Child Pros-
titution, and Child Pornography (United Nations General
Assembly, 2000a).
The Eastern District of Missouri Court in M.A. v. Vil-
lage Voice Media Holdings and Backpage.com decided
against M.A. on the basis of each of her claims, assert-
ing that “The actual injury suffered by M.A. is, as she
describes it, her victimization by McFarland,” and that
“[H]owever horrific the consequences to M.A. of McFar-
land’s posted ads were, the ads were created by McFar-
land.” Citing multiple Section 230 precedents, the court
held that neither notice of nor profit from the unlawful
nature of information provided by a third party renders
an ISP liable for that information: “Section 230 immunity
applies even after notice of the potentially unlawful na-
ture of the third-party content” (Lycos, Inc., 478 F.3d at
420, quoted inM.A. v. Village Voice Media Holdings and
Backpage.com, 2011, p. 199). The aiding and abetting
charges were dismissed based upon precedent that re-
quires intention to commit the particular crime in ques-
tion; here, the opinion states that “[M.A.’s] allegations
of Backpage.com aiding and abetting McFarland do not
describe the specific intent required for aiding and abet-
ting....Rather, those allegations describe only a violation
of Section 2255 by ‘the creation and maintenance of [a]
highly effective internet tool” (M.A. v. Village Voice Me-
diaHoldings andBackpage.com, 2011, pp. 206–207). The
court also denies M.A.’s right to civil remedy for criminal
actions under Section 2255 (which allows for civil rem-
edy for personal injuries to minors), asserting that Sec-
tion 230(e)(1) only allowed for prosecution of ISPs on fed-
eral criminal, not civil grounds (a problem of jurisdiction).
Finally, the court denied M.A.’s contention that the
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child superceded Section 230’s protective provision on
the grounds that while the Optional Protocol constitutes
an international law commitment, it does not by itself
function as binding federal law (M.A. v. Village Voice Me-
dia Holdings and Backpage.com, 2011, p. 212). Instead,
when the Senate ratified the Optional Protocol, it did
so as a non-self-executing treaty, meaning that it would
not create privately enforceable rights because its pro-
visions are already covered under existing domestic law.
And under that law, according to the court in this case,
M.A.’s remedies begin and end with her suit against her
trafficker, Natasha Jewell McFarland, because the host
of ads posted by her trafficker, Backpage.com, was pro-
tected under Section 230 of the CDA.
Several times throughout the opinion, the court ex-
pressed “sympathy” for the “horrific” circumstances of
M.A.’s “victimization,” but in each case, it wrung its
hands, making clear that the court was constrained (1)
by the jurisdiction of Section 230 (“Thus, regardless of
M.A.’s characterization of the policy choice of denying
Section 230 immunity in such circumstances as alleged
as “clear,” it nonetheless is a matter Congress has spo-
ken on and is for Congress, not this Court, to revisit”);
(2) by the procedural distinction of a civil remedy, even
one conferred as a private right of claim under a federal
criminal statute, versus federal criminal liability as read
through Section 230, finding in favor of the latter; and
(3) by the failure of Congress to create privately enforce-
able rights under international law. The court concludes:
Plaintiff artfully and eloquently attempts to phrase
her allegations to avoid the reach of Section 230.
Those allegations, however, do not distinguish the
complained-of actions of Backpage.com from any
other website that posted content that led to an in-
nocent person’s injury. Congress has declared such
websites to be immune from suits arising from such
injuries. It is for Congress to change the policy that
gave rise to such immunity (2010, p. 215).
This theme of “artful” framing of “sententious” claims
arises again in the Boston case, below, and can be read
as one of many rhetorical strategies evidenced in court
opinions that bracket or disparage plaintiffs’ accounts of
suffering so as to dismiss them in favor of precedent and
jurisdiction arising from Section 230.
Such interpretation on the part of judges reveal a
nomos that devalues the rights of children as a special
categorywhile also operating according to dominant gen-
der norms that, as children’s rights advocate Barbara
Bennett Woodhouse (2008) asserts, “generate cultural
stereotypes, which in turn generate laws based on these
disabling stereotypes” (loc. 1073). Such gendered stereo-
types are particularly damaging in the case of children
trafficked for commercial sex, who are often seen as “just
another ‘teen prostitute’…nameless, faceless, ignored,
already damaged…” (Lloyd, 2011, loc. 699). In just one
example of the manifestation of gendered cultural atti-
tudes in the Jane Doe cases, Judge Richard Posner, writ-
ing for the 7th Circuit in Dart v. Backpage.com, LLC, 2016,
acknowledged that a majority of ads on Backpage.com’s
adult section are for sex, but went on to assert that “a
majority is not all, and not all advertisements for sex are
advertisements for illegal sex.” In seeking to protect such
“legal” commercial sexual transactions, Judge Posner re-
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marked in open court, “What about also old people, old
menwho like to be seenwith a youngwoman, right. That
is an aspect of escort service, it’s not all sex.” This judicial
comment reveals the normalization of cultural attitudes
towardmen’s right to access women’s bodies, regardless
of age or of the potential for harm. As Rachel Lloyd, pros-
titution survivor and founder of Girls Educational and
Mentoring Service—a NYC agency that provides services
for girls and women who have survived commercial sex-
ual exploitation—is at pains to make clear, public sym-
pathy is retained for the few cases of abducted “Amber
Alert” children, those who fit a gendered and raced im-
age of purity and innocence, as opposed to the major-
ity of commercially sexually exploited children who are
homeless or runaways:
These girls and young women have a tougher time in
the court of public opinion and in the real courts of the
criminal and juvenile justice systems. It is presumed
that somewhere along the line they ‘chose’ this life,
and this damns them to be seen aswilling participants
in their own abuse (2011, loc. 1103)
As we will see, such deeply entrenched cultural attitudes
toward gender and sex find their way into the opinions
issued by judges in each of the Jane Doe cases such that
the testimony of these child plaintiffs to severe harm is
read—and dismissed—as merely “artful” or “eloquent”
distractions from the weightier truth of the law and
its precedents.
5.2. Washington: J.S., S.L., and L.C. v. Village Voice
Media Holdings, L.L.C., and Backpage.com, L.L.C.
The circumstances in J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings
and Backpage.com are similar to the St. Louis and Boston
cases, in that plaintiffs (collectively “J.S.”) were each be-
tween the ages of 13 and 15 years old when trafficked
for commercial sex by third parties on Backpage.com.
The suit asserts state law claims of negligence, outrage,
sexual exploitation of children, ratification/vicarious lia-
bility, unjust enrichment, invasion of privacy, sexual as-
sault and battery, and civil conspiracy as well as a private
right of claim conferred under federal criminal statutes
which criminalize “participation” in the sex trafficking
of children. Unsurprisingly, Backpage.com moved to dis-
miss the claims on the grounds that federal law (Sec-
tion 230) preempts both state law and federal private
right of claims; however, the case, which was appealed
to the Washington State Supreme Court, was decided,
surprisingly, in favor of the Jane Doe plaintiffs. The court
concluded that the plaintiffs had alleged sufficient facts
to support the conclusion that Backpage.com was not
simply a passive publisher, but was actively involved in
creating content. The court stated: “Backpage.com’s ad-
vertising posting rules were not simply neutral policies
prohibiting or limiting certain content but were instead
‘specifically designed…so that pimps can continue to use
Backpage.com to traffic in sex’” (J.S. v. Village Voice Me-
dia Holdings and Backpage.com, 2015, p. 8). These rules
and policies include age verificationwith prompting from
thewebsite (if a user enters an ageunder 18, they receive
an “oops” message that users must be 18 years of age
or older, at which point they are prompted to re-enter
an age,without verification); stripping ofmeta-data from
posted images so that they cannot be traced; encourage-
ment of the use of pre-paid credit cards in order to as-
sure anonymity of users, who are not required to provide
other identifying information, such as a telephone num-
ber; and finally, as the United States Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations later reported:
Backpage.com has knowingly concealed evidence
of criminality by systematically editing its ‘adult’
ads….The terms that Backpage.com has automatically
deleted from ads before publication include “Lolita,”
“teenage,” “rape,” “young,” “amber alert,” “little girl,”
“teen,” “fresh,” “innocent,” and “school girl.” (United
States Senate, 2017, p. 2)
J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings and Backpage.com
begs the question of why the Supreme Court in the State
of Washington concluded that “[f]act-finding on this is-
sue is warranted” when so many other courts have suc-
cumbed to Section 230 pressure (read: precedent), allow-
ing that even if it was clear that “horrific” acts had been
committed from within that shield, it was for Congress
and not the courts to remedy. One clue is to be found in
the concurring opinion of Justice Charles Wiggins, who
writes separately “to emphasize that this holding implies
that the plaintiffs’ claims do not treat Backpage.com as
the publisher or speaker of another’s information under
the CDA Section 230” (J.S. v. Backpage.com, Wiggins, J.,
Concurring, 2015, p. 1). Wiggins continues:
Backpage.com argues that plaintiffs’ inducement [to
sex trafficking] theory clearly treats them as pub-
lishers and that holding it liable would punish the
company for publishing third party content. To the
contrary, plaintiffs have alleged a totally different
theory—that Backpage.com guided pimps to craft in-
vitations to prostitution that appear neutral and le-
gal so that the pimps could advertise prostitution
and share their ill-gotten gains with Backpage.com.
Plaintiffs are not claiming that backpage.com itself is
acting as their pimp but that Backpage.com is pro-
moting prostitution, which is a crime in Washing-
ton…and should support a cause of action (J.S. v. Back-
page.com, Wiggins, J., Concurring, 2015, p. 10).
Here we see the power of straightforward federal and
state statutes to address the immunity provision of Sec-
tion 230 head on. As Attorney Erik Bauer shares:
Section 230 protects internet sites from getting sued
because of third party content, and it’s been tightly in-
Social Inclusion, 2017, Volume 5, Issue 2, Pages 3–15 9
terpreted. The way the statute reads, the keywords to
consider are whether an online publisher is “responsi-
ble inwhole or in part for the creation or development
of illegal content.” The statute does not say you have
to author the bad content; it says you have to be re-
sponsible in part for the creation or development of
illegal content. If they wanted to say authorship, they
would have said authorship. They didn’t use that term.
(Bauer, 2016, interview with author)
In other words, while Backpage.com and the courts that
have sided with it in Section 230 cases contend that they
did not author the content of the ads, and therefore are
protected by Section 230 against liability for harm arising
from them, the statutory language “responsible in part”
provides enough room for the courts to find against the
shield of Section 230.
The court in this case agrees, and also takes issue
with the term “immunity” as repeated in many decisions
that treat ISP’s as publishers, noting that the word does
not appear anywhere in the statute, and that:
Subsection 230(c)(1) is neither an immunity nor a
defense; it is a prohibition against considering the
provider as a publisher or speaker of content provided
by another. The main purpose of subsection 230(c)
is not to insulate providers from civil liability for ob-
jectionable content on their websites, but to protect
providers from civil liability for limiting access to ob-
jectionable content. (J.S. v. Backpage.com, 2015, Wig-
gins, J., Concurring, p. 5; emphasis mine)
Finally, the court does not accept Backpage.com’s avowal
that their efforts to prevent child sex trafficking consti-
tute “good faith” efforts, and decides to allow discov-
ery to proceed in order to…discover more. The failure of
other courts in the country to allow for such discovery
has frustrated plaintiffs and their teams, along with the
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, all
of whom desire the opportunities afforded by the discov-
ery process in order to more fully understand the nature
of the harms they seek to address.
In considering the Tacoma decision as an outlier, a
great deal turns on the court’s navigation of Section 230,
which runs against the tide ofmajority precedent, as well
as its belief that “It is important to ascertain whether
in fact Backpage.com designed its posting rules to in-
duce sex trafficking to determinewhether Backpage.com
is subject to suit under the CDA” (J.S. v. Village Voice
Media Holdings and Backpage.com, 2015, p. 8). Again,
keep in mind that each of these cases, having been dis-
missed at the federal district court or federal magistrate
level, advanced to the appeals phase simply asking to
proceed to discovery and trial, to be permitted to in-
vestigate claims of participation in what judges in these
cases unanimously acknowledge to be serious crimes
with grave injuries. Compare the majority decision to al-
low the question to be explored in discovery and trial
with the dissenting opinion, which concludes:
This case does not ask us to decide whether pimps
should be able to traffick [sic] our children without
consequence. The answer to that question is cer-
tainly no. And this case does not ask us to decide
whether third party accomplices or co-conspirators
should be able to escape criminal prosecution for hu-
man trafficking and child rape. The answer to that
is also a resounding no. Instead, the question be-
fore us is whether the CDA, a federal statute, shields
this defendant from this state law claim. Using set-
tled principles of statutory interpretation, the CDA
compels me to conclude that the answer to that
question is [yes].4 (J.S. v. Village Voice Media Hold-
ings and Backpage.com, 2015, Gordon McCloud, J.,
Dissent, p. 40)
If one thinks in terms of what Robert Cover calls “the
reality of common meaning,” then the first two “no’s”
advanced by McCloud in her dissent cannot co-exist
with the “yes” response to the third question; instead,
her rhetoric reveals the violent dissonance of the law
whereby, as Colin Dayan avers, “To think legally is to be
capable of detaching ways of thinking fromwhat is being
thought about” (Dayan, 2011, p. 12). Here, what is being
thought about is the rape of minor girls for the profit of
others, but the judge is “compelled” by the CDA and its
accompanying “settled principles of statutory interpreta-
tion” (precedent) to position herself in the absurd breach
that separates that harm from its redress.
5.3. Jane Doe No. 1 et al. v. Backpage.com, L.L.C. et al.
The final case under examination is Jane Doe No. 1 et
al. v. Backpage.com, L.L.C., brought in Boston in May
2015 on behalf of three minor girls trafficked for com-
mercial sex using ads posted on Backpage.com. This case,
brought by Boston law firm Ropes & Gray, alleges viola-
tions of the federal William Wilberforce Trafficking Vic-
tims Protection Reauthorization Act, the Massachusetts
Anti-Human Trafficking and Victim Protection Act, as well
as copyright infringement, unfair business practices, and
violation of privacy statutes. Here too, both the initial
complaint and the appeal in Boston’s First Circuit Court
of Appeals failed on the basis of CDA protection, as did a
plea to the United States Supreme Court to take the case.
I analyze this case and the rhetoric of the written opin-
ion in greater detail below as the clearest example of a
court bracketing the harm done to human bodies, in this
4 The original text of the opinion reads “Using settled principles of statutory interpretation, the CDA compels me to conclude that the answer to that
question is also no. J.S. fails to allege facts sufficient to provide that Backpage was a content provider as opposed to a service provider. Thus, subsection
230 immunizes Backpage from liability for JS’s claims. And Subsection 230 trumps conflicting state law claims.” It appears from the sense of the text
that the opinion mistakenly asserted that the answer to the third question was also “no,” but in fact the Justice means that the answer is “yes.”
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case via sex trafficking, failing to address the gaping hole
in Section 230 that allows for criminal activity to take
place because of a reliance upon what Colin Dayan calls
a “hoard” of precedent and what Robert Cover calls “def-
erence to political branches” (Dayan, 2011, p. 9; Cover,
1986, p. 58).
6. The Violence of the Law
It was perhaps his early immersion in the history of
United States slavery laws that gave rise to Robert
Cover’s later seminal work on the distance between the
law and the experiences of those who must live under
it—for surely there rarely has been such an egregious
detachment of legal interpretation from its lived implica-
tions than that exemplified in the various laws and codes
governing enslaved people and property in the antebel-
lum US. Cover first explored the question of unjust law
in Justice Accused: Antislavery and the Judicial Process
(1975), going on towrite two landmark essays on the sub-
ject of the “dissonance of the lawfulness of the intolera-
ble” in the 1980s (Cover, 1986, p. 39).5 These essays have
guided scholarly thinking in the intervening years about
how legal interpretation often hinders, rather than sup-
ports, the distribution of justice. While Cover’s essay ad-
dresses the harm done to criminal defendants, not plain-
tiffs, the overarching analysis of judicial behavior is rele-
vant to our discussion here.
For Cover (1983), the problem is that jurists often
fail to understand, on the one hand, the relation be-
tween the law and its interpretation, and on the other,
the normative world, or nomos,6 within which the law
operates: “Once understood in the context of the nar-
ratives that give it meaning, law becomes not merely a
system of rules to be observed, but a world in which
we live” (pp. 4–5). Cover (1983) recognized the force of
the nomos as being every bit as influential as “the phys-
ical universe of mass, energy, and momentum” (p. 5),
and more, identified this force as a violent one (1986):
“Between the idea and the reality of common meaning
falls the shadow of the violence of the law itself” (p.
1629). Cover understood that the accumulation of law
over time through precedent and jurisdiction could be
world creating orworld destroying, and that itwas largely
up to judges, as individuals and representatives of the
law, what kind of worlds would be engendered, which
would survive andwhich would be crushed. As Cover put
it, “Judges are people of violence. Because of the vio-
lence they command, judges characteristically do not cre-
ate law, but kill it….Confronting the luxuriant growth of a
hundred legal traditions, they assert that this one is law
and destroy or try to destroy the rest” (1983, p. 53).
We witness this confrontation among competing le-
gal claims and traditions in the Backpage.com cases, an-
alyzing the judicial response through the trail left by
the written opinions. In St. Louis, Tacoma, Boston, and
the many other cases against ISPs for their role in harm
done by postings on their internet sites, plaintiffs chal-
lenged one law, Section 230, with others: criminal and
civil statutes at federal and state levels, as well as inter-
national protocols and laws. In each case, the judges fa-
vored the nomos of one law—overwhelmingly, Section
230—over the others. Each court took it upon itself to
determine which law should prevail in the event of a con-
flict of laws—and in every case except for Washington
State, these judges found in favor of Section 230. The
prevailing nomos accompanying the chosen law is the ne-
oliberal vision of unfettered markets and revenue gener-
ation, while the nomos lost as a result of the judgments
prioritizes human rights and protections from harm, par-
ticularly for children who are defined a priori within the
law as vulnerable. In other words, evenwhen confronted
with two federally enacted statutes, onemuch later than
the other (typically, later statutes take precedence over
earlier ones in the case of a conflict), the courts have con-
tinued to generate positive legal outcomes—e.g., law—
around freedom of speech and markets (Section 230),
and negative legal outcomes around statutes meant to
protect bodies from harm (the Trafficking Victims Protec-
tion Act, the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, criminal trafficking and child sexual
exploitation statutes).
Let us examine how this “jurisgenerative” principle
works in practice, using the opinions set forth in the three
cases above. For both Cover andDayan, “It is through law
that persons, variously figured, gain or lose definition,
become victims of prejudice or inheritors of privilege.
And once outside the valuable discriminations of per-
sonhood, their claims become inconsequential” (Dayan,
2011, p. i). Here we can see the persons of Ferrer, Lacey,
and Larkin, as well as their proprietary manifestation
of corporate personhood, Backpage.com, gain definition,
standing, and the privilege to continue generating profit
each time Section 230 is used as a shield against what a
jurist in the J.S. v. Village Voice Media Holdings and Back-
page.com trial court proceeding concedes is too obvious
to ignore: “And, frankly, my note to myself in the side-
line was Backpage.com doesn’t know this is for prostitu-
tion and isn’t assisting with the development? And de-
spite the case law, I answer that question on the side the
plaintiffs and I’m denying [Backpage.com’s motion to dis-
miss]” (quoted in J.S. v. Village VoiceMedia Holdings and
Backpage.com, 2015, Gordon McCloud, J., Dissent, p. 5).
In this case, the judge bridges the gap between “the re-
ality of common meaning” and the exercise of the law,
erring on the side of the nomos experienced by vulner-
able people subjected to harm rather than that of ISP’s
generating revenues and profits. In order to do so, how-
5 These two essays are The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Foreword: Nomos and Narrative (1983) and Violence and the Word (1986).
6 In current usage, nomos refers to “the law; principles defining human conduct originating especially from culture and custom.” The term originates
from the classical Greek for usage, custom, law, melody, composition (Oxford English Dictionary online, n.d.). While nomos evokes and constitutes the
law, its meaning extends into the realm of the shared, ever-evolving, and often intractable cultural, historical, and ethical narratives that constitute the
“normative universes” in which we live.
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ever, she must transcend or override the power of prece-
dent and jurisdiction, both.
In her analysis of the violence of the law, Dayan de-
scribes “sinkholes of law where precedents gather, fes-
tering as they feed on juridical words, past and present”
(p. 9). For Cover (1983), too, precedents can generate:
…an entire nomos—an integrated world of obligation
and reality from which the rest of the world is per-
ceived. At that point of radical transformation of per-
spective, the boundary rule…becomes more than a
rule: it becomes constitutive of a world. We witness
normative mitosis. A world turned inside out; a wall
begins to form and its shape differs depending on
which side of the wall our narratives place us.” (p. 31)
While the judges in the Tacoma case scale narrowly down
the side of the wall accommodating allegiance to victims
of profound harm, those in the Boston case land on the
opposite side; indeed, as John Montgomery, lead attor-
ney for the Jane Doe plaintiffs in Boston, wrote in his Re-
ply Brief petitioning for appeal by the US Supreme Court,
“Had petitioners’ exact allegations been asserted in a dis-
trict court in the Ninth Circuit, or in Washington State
court, their claimswould not have been dismissed” (Jane
Doe v. Backpage.com, Reply Brief, p. 5). This is because
the judges in the Ninth Circuit departed from the “hun-
dreds of reported decisions [that] have interpreted Sec-
tion 230…[finding] that the website is entitled to immu-
nity from liability” (Jane Doe v. Backpage.com, Opp. Brief,
2016, pp. 4–5). And indeed, negative responses to the
J.S. decision ground their claims in the argument that J.S.
“deviates from precedent” and “subverts the policy ratio-
nales behind Section 230,” thereby “mark[ing] the open-
ing of themetaphorical litigation floodgates [and] imped-
ing policy goals such as technological innovation, user
control, and choice in the freemarkets” (Lee, 2016, p. 12).
Characterizing sex trafficking, especially of minors, as a
“serious and sensitive public policy issue in Washington”
rather than a serious and gravely harmful criminal act
and human rights violation, the comment finds the Ninth
Circuit court’s discretion in allowing the case to proceed
to trial “unwelcome in a judicial system that emphasizes
the predictability of legal outcomes [and] highly detri-
mental to ISP’s, which seek clear precedents for their
business decisions” (Lee, 2016, p. 16, emphasis added).
Witness what Cover called “normative mitosis”: the cre-
ation of a world in which the ability of corporations to
plan business decisions based upon the extent to which
they can count on precedent to protect them from crim-
inal liability takes precedence (entendre intended) over
the right of children to be protected from trafficking, sex-
ual exploitation, and rape.
Further, the rhetoric of Judge Bruce M. Selya in the
First Circuit court of Appeals (Boston) contributes to the
creation of this nomos inasmuch as his opinion adopts
a style of rhetorical gamesmanship in tackling plaintiffs’
claims one by one, bracketing the gendered harm done
to the plaintiffs in the process of interpreting and up-
holding Section 230 precedent against them. As it hap-
pens, Judge Selya is known for his complex, “quirky,” and
erudite writing style; still, as one commentator pointed
out, his flourishes can “demean litigants and the legal
process” (Garner, quoted in Margolick, 1992).7 They cer-
tainly do in the Jane Doe case, in precisely the manner
that worries legal scholars like Cover and Dayan.
Selya begins by acknowledging the difficulty of the
case because of the bodily harm suffered by plaintiffs:
“This is a hard case—hard not in the sense that the le-
gal issues defy resolution, but hard in the sense that the
law requires that we, like the court below, deny relief
to plaintiffs whose circumstances evoke outrage” (Jane
Doe No. 1 et al. v. Backpage.com, 2016, p. 3). Granted,
Selya does not acknowledge that he or the other two jus-
tices hearing the case themselves experience outrage at
the plaintiffs’ circumstances, only that the circumstances
(which he declines to name or define) evoke outrage in
the abstract; to be sure, there is precious little by way
of attention to such outrage in the opinion that follows.
Indeed, Selya later asserts that:
[T]he appellants contend that [Backpage.com’s]
course of conduct amounts to participation in sex traf-
ficking and, thus, can ground liability without treating
Backpage.com as the publisher or speaker of any of
the underlying content. This contention comprises
more cry than wool. (Jane Doe v. Backpage.com,
2016, p. 14)
“More cry than wool” is an antiquated proverb that orig-
inated with the cries made by sheep while being shorn,
the assumption being that there is no real pain in those
cries, and the proverb coming to mean a “dramatic as-
sertion backed by little evidence” (Simpson & Speake,
2008). Selya’s use of a figure of speech that makes its
meaning by dismissing the substance of an expression of
pain emanating from another being is more in keeping
with the treatment by the court of the suffering expe-
rienced by plaintiffs than his earlier abstract characteri-
zation of their claims as “circumstances that evoke out-
rage.” It demonstrates the overall glossing over of plain-
tiffs’ suffering evidenced throughout the opinion.
Selya concludes his brief introduction to the case
with the simple sentence, “The tale follows,” thereby
highlighting what Dayan calls the “achingly disparate sig-
nificant experience” of the judge (perpetrator) and plain-
tiff (victim) of the “organized violence” that is law:
For the perpetrator, the pain and fear are remote, un-
real, and largely unshared. They are, therefore, almost
never made a part of the interpretive artifact, such as
the judicial opinion….[F]or those who impose the vio-
lence the justification is important, real and carefully
cultivated. Conversely, for the victim, the justification
7 Thanks to David Nersessian for bringing this matter of Selya’s unique writing style to my attention.
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for the violence recedes in reality and significance in
proportion to the overwhelming reality of the pain
and fear that is suffered.” (2011, loc. 1629)
For Selya, “Striking the balance in away thatwe believe is
consistent with both congressional intent and the teach-
ings of precedent” is an important, real, and carefully cul-
tivated justification for denying relief for the pain and
fear of plaintiffs who, as a result of this opinion, will not
be entitled to relief, redress, or justice (Jane Doe v. Back-
page.com, p. 3). To preface one’s rationale for an opinion
that destroys a person’s ability to pursue justice by intro-
ducing it as a “tale” (“a story imaginatively told,” accord-
ing to the Oxford English Dictionary online, n.d.) is to triv-
ialize the narrative of suffering experienced by but not
limited to the three plaintiffs in the case. Selya’s tale is
a remote walk through judicial precedent and legislative
intent, while the claimants’ tale is a horror story: the de-
humanization, exploitation, and rape of children to line
another’s pockets. But Selya’s prevails, thereby providing
a cautionary “tale” to other victims who might seek pro-
tection in the courts: don’t bother.
Despite these stakes, Selya proceeds through the
opinion as if it is simply a tale, or a game, at stake,
embracing without ambivalence Section 230 precedent
throughout, as when he triumphantly claims, “Prece-
dent clinches the matter” (Jane Doe v. Backpage.com,
p. 15). He further characterizes the complaint as reliant
upon “sententious rhetoric rather than well-pleaded
facts” (p. 18) or upon charges of “Machiavellian manip-
ulation…as surrogates for well-pleaded facts” (p. 19);
designates plaintiff’s claims about the status of Back-
page.com as participant in the development of its on-
line posting as “a pair of end runs” around Section 230
(p. 19); calls plaintiff’s claim that Backpage.com profited
from unauthorized use of the girls’ photos as a “fusillade
wide of the mark” (pp. 29–30); and describes plaintiff’s
final contention that their right to privacy was violated
when Backpage.com posted their photos as “a last ditch
effort to bell the cat” (p. 35).
In addition to likening the plaintiff’s claims to (failed)
tactical moves in sporting events and war games, Selya
diminishes the assertions of harm embedded therein in
gendered terms as hyperbolic, hysterical, or pompously
moralizing, in contrast with the rationality of “well-
pleaded facts.” In the rare moments when he appears to
acknowledge such suffering as real or true, he then dis-
misses it on the basis of both precedent and jurisdiction,
as in his conclusion:
“As a final matter, we add a coda. The appellants’
core argument is that Backpage.com has tailored its
website to make sex trafficking easier. Aided by the
amici, the appellants have made a persuasive case
for that proposition. But Congress did not sound an
uncertain trumpet when it enacted the CDA, and it
chose to grant broad protections to internet publish-
ers….If the evils that the appellants have identified are
deemed to outweigh the First Amendment values that
drive the CDA, the remedy is through legislation, not
through litigation. We need go no further” (Jane Doe
v. Backpage.com, 2015, p. 37, emphasis added).
7. Conclusion
We need go no further. It is perhaps this tone of certi-
tude that clinches (to borrow from Selya) the interpre-
tive violence of this decision. For indeed we must go fur-
ther, and as current events would have it, will go further.
The nomos of certitude around Section 230 has been un-
settled in legislative, criminal, and judicial contexts. The
Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations held
Carl Ferrer in civil contempt of Congress for refusing to
reply to its subpoena for information on Backpage.com
business practices or even to show up to a hearing on
the matter in November 2015. In January, 2017, Ferrer,
Lacey, and Larkin were forced to appear before the Sub-
committee, at which time they each invoked their Fifth
Amendment rights not to testify, amove that “validat[es]
the Senate’s report on their illegal activities,” according
to Subcommittee Chair Senator Rob Portman, who adds
that Backpage.com has “put profits ahead of vulnerable
women and children”—as, indeed, the judicial interpre-
tation of Section 230 and the accumulation of precedent
has allowed them to do (quoted in Daly, 2017). Andwhile
the October 2016 pimping charges against Ferrer, Lacey,
and Larkin were dropped (by a court that accepted Sec-
tion 230 as sufficient prophylaxis against criminal liabil-
ity), the State of California has brought new charges that
led to another indictment for Ferrer, Lacey, and Larkin.
Finally, the Tacoma case against Backpage.com in the
Ninth Circuit on behalf of J.S. will go forward in May,
2017. Should it succeed, an important new precedent
will be established, one that disrupts the normative pri-
oritization of freedom of commerce, infusing life into
the nomos of human rights that has languished in the
shadow of Section 230. That case is still alive, notwith-
standing recent filings by Backpage.com to stay that ac-
tion, stating that it must deal with a new grand jury in-
vestigation currently underway before it can address the
civil claims. As of this writing, the adult services sections
on the Backpage.com website have been shuttered, and
Backpage.com has posted a note under each adult ser-
vices category heading that reads “Censored! The gov-
ernment has unconstitutionally censored this content,”
and that invites readers to “protect internet free speech”
using the hashtags #FREESPEECH #BACKPAGE, empha-
sizing once more Backpage.com’s commitment to the
nomos of freedom of speech which actually acts as cover
for unstated subtexts: freedom from costly litigation that
hinders business operations; freedom of commerce and
profit generation.
Returning to the discussion of slavery at the start
of this work, acknowledging that concrete definitions
and legal redress are challenging in an era in which slav-
ery has been abolished legally but continues to thrive
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materially, we would do well to remember Orlando
Patterson’s (1982) description of slavery “as a special
form of human parasitism” (p. 14) characterized by “di-
rect and insidious violence…namelessness and invisibil-
ity…endless personal violation…and chronic inalienable
dishonor” (p. 12). Stopping the parasitic flow of profits to
Backpage.com executives from the bodies of those chil-
dren trafficked on their website will entail review and,
likely, amendment to Section 230 by Congress. But in the
meantime, judges and courts must reject the neoliberal
nomos that has pooled in the accumulation of precedent
in this case, must transcend the current judicial “commit-
ment to hierarchical ordering of authority first, and to in-
terpretive integrity only later,” (Cover, 1983, p. 58), and
must restore protectionof the gendered subjects seeking
redress from the criminal harm of child sex trafficking to
the center of future cases.
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